John Searle

Whatever is referred to must exist. Let us call this the axiom of existence. ↗

— John Searle

#call #exist #existence #let us #must

An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived. ↗

— John Searle

#derived #intrinsic #just #utterance #whereas

Berkeley had a liberal element in the student body who tended to be quite active. I think that's in general a feature of intellectually active places. ↗

— John Searle

#berkeley #body #element #feature #general

I want to block some common misunderstandings about "understanding": In many of these discussions one finds a lot of fancy footwork about the word "understanding." ↗

— John Searle

#block #common #discussions #fancy #finds

I will argue that in the literal sense the programmed computer understands what the car and the adding machine understand, namely, exactly nothing. ↗

— John Searle

#argue #car #computer #exactly #i

In many cases it is a matter for decision and not a simple matter of fact whether x understands y; and so on. ↗

— John Searle

#decision #fact #many #matter #simple

My car and my adding machine understand nothing: they are not in that line of business. ↗

— John Searle

#business #car #line #machine #nothing

Our tools are extensions of our purposes, and so we find it natural to make metaphorical attributions of intentionality to them; but I take it no philosophical ice is cut by such examples. ↗

— John Searle

#examples #extensions #find #i #ice

There are clear cases in which "understanding" literally applies and clear cases in which it does not apply; and these two sorts of cases are all I need for this argument. ↗

— John Searle

#apply #argument #cases #clear #does

We often attribute 'understanding' and other cognitive predicates by metaphor and analogy to cars, adding machines, and other artifacts, but nothing is proved by such attributions. ↗

— John Searle

#adding #analogy #attribute #cars #cognitive